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Abstract: We sketch the main aspects of Greece’s electricity system from a market-based point of 
view. First, we provide data concerning the mix of generating units, the system load and the frequency-
related ancillary services. Then, we formulate a simplified model of Greece’s Day-Ahead Scheduling 
(DAS) problem that constitutes the basis for our analysis. We examine various cases concerning the 
format of the objective function as well as the pricing and compensation schemes. An illustrative 
example is used to indicate the impact of reserve and fixed (start-up, shut-down, and minimum-load) 
costs on the resulting dispatching of units and on clearing prices, under the different cases. Our analysis 
aims at unveiling the impact of cost components other than energy offers on the DAS problem, and 
provide the grounds for future research on the design of the electricity market. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1996, European Directive 96/92/EC set as a goal the 
liberalization and the integration of the national 
electricity markets, leading to fundamental changes in 
the organization of the electricity sector, with new 
companies entering the wholesale or retail electricity 
markets and the creation of transmission and 
distribution system operators. As these entities are 
needed to function in a non-discriminatory and 
transparent way, significant emphasis was given to the 
wholesale market rules governing the scheduling of the 
generating units and the energy that they are called to 
produce. 
In Greece, the electricity wholesale market was first 
introduced with Law 2773/1999, followed by a 
subsequent electricity Law (no. 3175/2003) and a Grid 
Control and Power Exchange Code for Electricity 
(Regulatory Authority for Energy, 2005) providing the 
details for the development of a centrally organized 
daily wholesale market, through which all electricity 
generated and consumed in Greece would be 
transacted. The Code is progressively being put in 
force over a transitory period extending from October 
2005 till the middle of 2009.  
The Greek wholesale market is designed as a pure 
mandatory pool consisting of: 
(a) The Day-Ahead (DA) market, where the 
scheduling and clearing of the total energy 
produced and consumed in Greece, as well as 
imports and exports, takes place (‘mandatory’ 
pool).  
(b) The Real Time Dispatch operation. 
(c) The Imbalances Settlement, which includes the 
settlement of energy deviations from the DA 
program and the settlement of the services 
required for the balancing of the system. 
(d) The Capacity Assurance Mechanism, through 
which part of the fixed costs of the production 
capacity are covered. 
The basis for the wholesale electricity market 
operation is the Day-Ahead Scheduling (DAS) 
program, which minimizes the overall cost of serving 
energy load for the next day, under conditions of 
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reliable system operation, while ensuring adequate 
reserves. In other words, the DAS program is a 
security-constrained unit commitment program, co-
optimizing energy and reserves. 
 
 
2. Greece’s Electricity System 
 
Greece has a variety of generating units: lignite, natural 
gas, oil, hydro plants, renewable energy sources (RES) 
such as wind parks, small hydros, biomass, 
photovoltaic, and cogeneration. The vast majority of 
thermal plants and all hydro plants belong to the Public 
Power Corporation (PPC). Only one Combined Cycle 
Gas Turbine (CCGT) unit of 390 MW and one small 
Gas Turbine (GT) unit belong to private producers. 
Wind parks are also privately-owned for the most part. 
It is obvious that the market is highly concentrated, as 
PPC holds about 95% of the market share. However, 
one more CCGT unit of 350 MW is in the process of 
entering the market by the end of October 2008, while 
construction has begun for at least two more CCGT 
units. 
The total capacity installed by unit type is listed in 
Table 1, while the yearly load profile for 2007 is shown 
in Figure 1, where the hourly load has been ordered 
from highest to lowest. 
 
Table 1. Installed capacity by unit type 
Unit type Number 
of units 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Lignite 22 4808.10 
Oil 4 718.00 
Combined Cycle 5 1962.10 
Natural Gas 3 486.80 
Small Τhermal 2 116.10 
Hydro 39 3016.50 
RES/Cogeneration >100 889.94 
Total Capacity: 11997.54 
Total Capacity (w/o RES/Cogen.): 11107.60 
Total Capacity    (thermal plants): 8091.10 
 
 
Figure 1. Yearly load profile for 2007 
 
Greece is a UCTE (Union for Coordination of 
Transmission of Electricity) member and is 
interconnected with Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria in 
the North, and Italy in the North-West. The north 
interconnections have a net transfer capacity of about 
600 MW and the interconnection with Italy 500 MW. 
The frequency-related ancillary services are primary, 
secondary and tertiary reserve based on the timeframe 
each service is provided. The primary reserve 
requirement is set at 80 MW, the secondary reserve 
requirement is set at 150-300 MW for secondary up 
and 50-150 MW for secondary down; 50 MW of both 
up and down should be fast secondary reserve. Tertiary 
reserve requirement is set at 300-600 MW. In this 
paper, by the term “reserves” we mean only the 
frequency-related ancillary services. 
Greece has a particularity concerning the location of 
generation and consumption. While most of the power 
plants are located in the North, the majority of the 
energy consumption takes place in the South. As a 
result, in case of high load, a transmission constraint is 
activated, prohibiting the transfer of the desired amount 
of energy from the North to the South. The amount of 
energy that can be transferred is about 3200 MW. To 
deal with this particularity of excess capacity in the 
North, Greece is divided in two operational zones 
(North – South) and producers are paid at different 
prices (Marginal Generating Prices) when the above 
transmission constraint is activated. Suppliers, 
however, face a uniform price, the System Marginal 
Price (SMP) regardless of their location. Andrianesis et 
al. (2007) state this two-zone model and show the 
incentives that it provides for the installation of new 
generation near consumption. 
 
 
3. Day-Ahead Scheduling Problem 
 
The DAS problem is solved every day, simultaneously 
for all 24 hours of the next day. The objective is to 
minimize the cost of matching the energy to be 
absorbed with the energy to be injected in the system, 
under the transmission constraints, the generation 
units’ technical constraints and the reserve 
requirements. The DAS problem defines how each unit 
should operate in each hour, so that the social welfare 
of the electricity market is maximized. It also 
determines the clearing prices of the energy and 
primary and secondary reserve markets. Currently, 
tertiary reserve is not remunerated, but the relative 
requirement enters the DAS program as a constraint. 
The producers submit energy offers for each hour of 
the following day, as a stepwise function of price-
quantity pairs, with successive prices being strictly 
non-decreasing. They also submit primary and 
secondary reserve bids as price-quantity pairs, and 
shut-down costs that are considered equal to their 
warm start-up costs. The technical characteristics of the 
generation units that constitute the constraints of the 
DAS problem include the technical minimum and 
maximum output, the maximum reserve availability, 
the minimum up and down times, and the ramp up and 
down limits. 
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Demand for energy and reserve requirements are 
exogenously determined by the Hellenic Transmission 
System Operator (HTSO), and are therefore considered 
as parameters of the optimization problem. 
The DAS problem, as is explicitly defined in the grid 
code, is a very complicated mixed integer program-
ming model which requires significant effort in order 
to be implemented. For the purpose of this paper, we 
developed a simpler version of the model that allows us 
to focus mainly on the impact of reserve offers and 
fixed costs. For simplicity, this reduced model is being 
referred as the DAS problem.  
The DAS problem can be formulated as a mixed 
integer linear programming problem (MILP) as 
follows: 
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The objective function (1) aims at minimizing a cost 
function that can include the cost for providing energy 
and reserves as well as fixed costs. The vector xu,h 
represents the commodities of the electricity market, 
such as energy and reserves. The vector zu,h represents 
the status of the generating units and other auxiliary 
variables, such as start-up and shut-down signals. 
Vectors cu,h and du are the cost coefficients for the 
commodities of energy and reserves, i.e., the price part 
of the energy and reserves offers, and the fixed costs, 
which can include the start-up, shut-down and 
minimum-load cost, respectively.  
Constraint (2) is the market-clearing constraint, i.e., 
the energy balance and the reserve requirements. 
Constraint (3) represents the generating units’ technical 
constraints, such as the technical minimum, technical 
maximum and the reserve availability constraint. 
Equality (4) states the initial conditions of the units. 
Assuming that each unit submits a single price-
quantity offer in each hour, the vectors and matrices in 
(1) - (4) can be written as follows, using the notation in 
the Appendix: 
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In the above, we assumed that only one type of 
reserve is addressed. To deal with all types of 
frequency-related ancillary services, the reserve 
requirement constraint has to be applied at every type, 
taking into consideration the substitutability of lower 
quality services by higher quality ones. The general 
formulation of constraint (2) is applicable to all types 
of constraints; nevertheless, the purpose of this paper is 
served even by addressing only one type of reserve.  
Moreover, we have to note that the start-up and shut-
down signal variables Yu,h and Vu,h are dependent 
variables and are defined by the status variables STu,h 
and STu,h–1. For example, the start-up variable Yu,h is 
defined by the following equality:
 
, , , 1(1 )u h u h u hY ST ST −= −  ,u h∀               (5) 
To avoid the non-linear term STu,h⋅STu,h–1, we can 
replace (5) by the following two inequalities: 
, , , 1u h u h u hY ST ST −≥ −    ,u h∀               (6) 
, , 1 ,1.1(1 ) 0.1u h u h u hST ST Y−− + − ≥    ,u h∀              (7) 
For simplicity we did not include these inter-temporal 
constraints in the formulation, as this would result in 
more complex B matrices. It is left to the interested 
reader to reform the matrices so as to include these 
constraints. 
To make things clearer, we can rewrite the DAS 
problem, in its simple version, as follows: 
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To complete the above formulation we must add the 
constraints that define dependent variables, e.g., 
equality (5) or the equivalent inequalities (6)-(7), as 
well as any other constraint that we wish to take into 
account, such as units’ minimum up and down times. 
In this case, some additional integer variables such as 
time counters and auxiliary variables need to be added 
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to sort out for nonlinearities. Once the complete MILP 
problem is stated, it can be solved using any 
commercial MILP solver available. Note that the dual 
variables (shadow prices) that appear in parentheses 
next to constraints (9)-(13) refer to the resulting LP 
problem when the integer variables are fixed at their 
optimal values. 
 
 
3.1 Impact of Reserve Offers 
 
The formulation of the DAS problem gives rise to 
numerous market design issues and questions 
concerning the reserves. Does it make sense to price 
reserves as a separate commodity? Should the 
producers submit priced offers for reserves or not? 
What pricing scheme should be used? How do reserve 
bids influence the generation unit scheduling? What 
rules should apply for these bids (price caps, rules 
against price reversals, etc.)? How should the reserve 
offers be included in the objective function? Should all 
reserves be treated in the same way? These and other 
questions arise from the various market designs applied 
all over the world, but answering them is not 
straightforward.  
In this paper, we will assume that producers submit 
offers for reserves and examine some of the most often 
implemented pricing schemes for reserves. In the 
following, we list the pricing schemes, which we will 
examine in section 4: 
1. Scheme based on shadow price: 
a. Non-priced reserves bids (sorting rule based on 
energy bids) 
b. Priced reserves bids included in the objective 
function 
2. Scheme based on the highest bid accepted: 
a. Reserves bids not included in the objective 
function (sorting rule based on reserve bids) 
b. Reserves bids included in the objective function 
3. Pay-as-bid scheme: 
a. Reserves bids not included in the objective 
function (sorting rule based on reserves bids) 
b. Reserve bids included in the objective function 
The shadow price approach is based on the dual 
variable of the reserve requirements constraint. The 
producer may submit priced or non-priced reserves 
bids. If non-priced bids are submitted, a sorting rule 
has to be applied to deal with multiple solutions of the 
DAS problem, i.e., to allocate the reserve; such a rule 
could be based on the energy bids. In case of priced 
reserves bids, which are included as a cost in the 
objective function, under marginal pricing theory 
(Sshweppe et al., 1988), there exists a strong energy-
reserve interaction. Andrianesis et al. (2008) show this 
interaction in detail and explain its origin by addressing 
the coupling effect between energy and reserve. 
The highest bid accepted scheme compensates all 
units with a uniform price that is set at the highest 
reserve bid that is included in the DAS. The reserves 
bids may or may not be included in the objective 
function.  
The pay-as-bid scheme sets different reserve prices 
for producers, with every unit being paid their bid if 
chosen to provide the corresponding service. As in the 
previous cases, the reserves bids may or may not be 
included in the objective function. 
 
 
3.2 Impact of Fixed Costs 
 
Fixed costs introduce non-convexities in the problem. 
O’ Neill et al. (2005) address this issue and show the 
non existence of equilibrium prices in a Walrasian 
auction. Their analysis was motivated by electricity 
markets, and the non-convexities that appear there are 
due to the generation units’ characteristics. Their basic 
contribution is that they value the activities that are 
associated with the integer variables through shadow 
prices in such a way that the market is cleared. In a 
parallel work, Hogan and Ring (2003) present a 
minimum uplift pricing approach that focuses on non-
convexities, taking into account the technical minimum 
and maximum constraints and the start-up costs. 
Bjørndal and Jörnsten (2004) address the same issue, 
proposing a methodology based on the generation of a 
separating valid inequality that supports the optimal 
resource allocation.  
In the DAS problem, the introduction of a fixed cost 
component in the objective function can be interpreted 
as a means for preventing frequent start-ups and shut-
downs, rather than as an incentive for the units to bid 
their true costs, as is the usual case. Thus, the units 
have to incorporate somehow the minimum load and 
start-up and shut-down costs in their energy offers, 
because there is no bid or cost recovery mechanism. 
This in turn means that the SMP will reflect these 
costs, distorting the energy price. In a recent 
amendment in Greece’s Grid and Market Operations 
Code in May 2008, a cost recovery clause was added 
for the transitory period, allowing for marginal cost but 
not full cost recovery. 
At this point, we should clarify what we mean by the 
term “minimum-load cost.” As is implied by its name, 
it is a €/hour value reflecting the cost of a unit 
operating at its technical minimum. A similar cost 
component is the no-load cost, which is used in some 
markets to represent the hourly cost of a unit that is 
online but does not produce. It is believed by some 
market designers that such a cost component should be 
addressed directly, so that the units will not have to 
incorporate it in their stepwise energy offers. However, 
nowadays, in most markets, the usual practice is to 
apply the minimum-load cost but not the no-load cost. 
In any case, either approach results in an hourly cost 
that should be included in the DAS provided that the 
unit is online. 
In the example that follows, we will also examine the 
impact of including or excluding the fixed costs from 
the biddings and the DAS problem. 
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4. Illustrative Example 
 
In this section, we present some results from solving 
the DAS problem described above on an illustrative 
case. The input data to the DAS problem are listed in 
Tables 2 and 3. The demand data are shown in Figure 
2. Quantities are given in MW and prices for energy 
and reserve bids in €/MWh. The bids are considered to 
be the same for all 24 hours. Minimum up and down 
times are given in hours and start-up, shut-down and 
minimum-load costs are in €. The reserve requirement 
is set at 600 MW for all 24 hours. 
 
Table 2. Units’ energy and reserve offers 
Unit maxuQ  minuQ  ,gu hP  biduR  ,ru hP  
u1 4000 2500 35 300 10 
u2 450 250 80 50   5 
u3 476 144 72 150   4 
u4 300 150 110 80   4.5 
u5 550 155 75 150 6 
u6 389 240 70 149 3.5 
u7 389 240 85 149 3 
u8 141 0 150 141 2 
 
 
Table 3. Units’ data 
Unit MUu 
= MDu 
SUCu 
= SDCu 
MLCu STu,0 
u1 24 1000000          -  1 
u2 8 40000 800 0 
u3 8 16000 550 1 
u4 16 30000 1000 0 
u5 5 24000 700 1 
u6 3 14000 500 1 
u7 3 14000 600 0 
u8 0 5000 200 0 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Demand data (load curve) 
 
Unit u1 is an aggregate representation of all lignite 
units available for producing. This unit corresponds to 
about 80% of the installed lignite units, assuming that 
the rest 20% is not available due to scheduled 
maintenance or outages. Unit u2 is an aggregate 
representation of the available oil units. Units u3-u7 
represent existing gas units, and unit u8 is a gas turbine 
that can provide all its capacity for reserve. Hydro 
plants are subject to different rules and scheduling and 
are therefore not included in this example. The demand 
has been adjusted to take into account the hydros’ 
contribution as well as renewables, imports and 
exports. 
As we consider only one block for energy offers, 
parameter MLCu is treated as an additive hourly cost. 
Had we considered stepwise offers, it would be more 
appropriate to include the cost for providing energy at 
the minimum output in the minimum-load cost 
component; energy offers would then start from the 
technical minimum to avoid double counting. 
We used the mathematical programming language 
AMPL (Fourer et al. 1993) to model the DAS problem, 
and the ILOG CPLEX 9.0 optimization software 
package to solve it. 
The results for the hourly SMP and Reserve Price 
(RP) under the different pricing schemes defined in 
section 3.1 are shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. SMPs and RPs for different pricing schemes 
 
The SMP does not exhibit significantly different 
behavior under the different cases and generally 
follows the load. The RP, as is expected, is much more 
sensitive to the pricing scheme. High RP spikes are 
observed under the shadow price approach (1a and 1b), 
which are due to reserve shortages. The highest bid 
accepted schemes (2a and 2b) have a less volatile 
behavior. Reserve prices in pay-as-bid schemes cannot 
be shown in the same figure, as they are not uniform 
for all units. 
Assuming that the units are paid the SMP for energy, 
RP for reserve and their fixed costs, their net profits for 
the various pricing schemes are presented in Table 4. 
The same results are shown in Table 5, but in 
€/MWh, i.e., each unit’s net profits are divided by the 
daily production of the unit, as this is scheduled by the 
DAS solution. This representation can be more 
indicative of the units’ net profits allowing for 
comparisons to be made among units. An interesting 
direction for further research would be to take into 
account these values and try to reform the bids so as to 
eliminate losses. However, this is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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Table 4. Units’ net profits in € 
Unit Case 
1a 
Case 
1b 
Case 
2a 
Case 
2b 
Case 
3a 
Case 
3b 
u1 2636000 2662820 2647990 2650650 2636660 2650650 
u2 -30150 -26175 -28300 -27125 -28750 -27875 
u3 -3002 19935 -32 145 -12912 -12135 
u4 - - - - - - 
u5 -21280 905 -19210 -19045 -24244 -24446 
u6 20155 28475 20074 20880 15340 16431 
u7 -7812 -5428 -6024 -6024 -7812 -7812 
u8 22701 44133 15910 25380 6768 6768 
 
 
Table 5. Units’ net profits in €/MWh 
Unit Case 
1a 
Case 
1b 
Case 
2a 
Case 
2b 
Case 
3a 
Case 
3b 
u1 28.562 28.853 28.692 28.721 28.570 28.721 
u2 -7.947 -6.899 -7.459 -7.149 -7.578 -7.347 
u3 -0.486 3.163 -0.005 0.023 -2.090 -1.925 
u4 - - - - - - 
u5 -4.369 0.186 -3.944 -3.910 -4.977 -5.019 
u6 4.193 6.080 4.176 4.459 3.191 3.509 
u7 -8.138 -5.654 -6.275 -6.275 -8.138 -8.138 
u8 N/A1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that the generation 
units may incur losses by participating in the DAS, 
unless a compensation mechanism is applied. Although 
we assumed that they are compensated for their fixed 
costs, the fact that units may produce at their minimum 
output for some hours, means that they cannot directly 
influence the SMP at those hours. Thus, the SMP at 
which they are paid for energy is less than their bid and 
in some cases substantially less than their variable cost. 
For instance, at hours when the lignite units are the 
marginal units and set the SMP, the gas units are extra-
marginal and produce energy at a cost far exceeding 
the price that they will get paid for energy. 
A possible compensation scheme could be, e.g., to 
remunerate these units on a variable cost basis for those 
hours. Such a scheme, combined with full fixed cost 
compensation would eliminate losses for units. Another 
scheme, which is commonly implemented in practice 
as part of bid/cost recovery mechanisms, is the 
comparison on a daily (24-hour) basis of the market 
revenue versus the relevant bid/cost of the unit. If the 
second value is greater, then the unit is compensated 
for the difference. Both of these compensation 
mechanisms are incentive compatible, as they give the 
proper incentives to the units to bid their true costs. 
Opportunities for making profit through their 
participation in the DAS would then appear at hours 
when units are infra-marginal, i.e., their offers are 
below the SMP. The reserve payments could also be 
used as a mean for units to cover their losses. 
                                                 
1
 N/A: Not applicable. Unit u8 is included in the DAS only for 
reserve.  
To get an idea of the magnitude of energy and reserve 
payments under the cases that have been discussed 
earlier, we provide the relative data in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Overall payments 
 
 
Case 
Overall 
Energy 
Payments 
Overall 
Reserve 
Payments 
Overall Fixed Costs 
 
SUC 
 
SDC 
 
MLC 
1a 7281950 96600 73000 28000 57200 
1b 7299050 187800 (as 1a) (as 1a) (as 1a) 
2a (as 1a) 110400 (as 1a) (as 1a) (as 1a) 
2b (as 1b) 108000 (as 1a) (as 1a) (as 1a) 
3a (as 1a) 65032 (as 1a) (as 1a) (as 1a) 
3b (as 1b) 64722 (as 1a) (as 1a) (as 1a) 
 
We also listed the overall fixed costs by type, which 
are the same for all cases, as, in our example, the unit 
commitment does not change under the different 
pricing schemes for reserves. However, this may not 
always be the case. In fact, when we examine the 
impact of the fixed costs, we see that the unit 
commitment may change. To show the impact of 
including or excluding fixed costs in the objective 
function, we list the statuses of the units for all the 
above mentioned pricing schemes in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Unit commitment 
Unit 
Fixed costs 
included 
Fixed costs 
excluded 
Cases 
1a,1b,2a,2b,3a,3c 
Cases 
1a,1b,2a,2b,3b 
Case 
3a 
u1 1-24 1-24 1-24 
u2 10-24 10-22 10-24 
u3 1-24 1-24 1-24 
u4 - - - 
u5 1-24 1-24 1-24 
u6 9-24 9-24 9-24 
u7 11-14 11-14 11-14 
u8 1-24 1-24 1-24 
 
We observe a change for unit u2, which in most cases 
shuts down at hour 22, when the fixed costs are 
excluded from the objective function. 
We have to note that the input to the DAS was the 
same regardless of whether the fixed costs were 
included in the objective function or not. However, this 
assumption is not very realistic, because, if the fixed 
costs are not included in the DAS, the units will not get 
paid for them. This would mean that they would have 
to internalize these costs in their offers, which in turn 
would cause a deviation of the SMP from the marginal 
cost for energy. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the previous sections we presented a sketch of 
Greece’s electricity system and formulated a simplified 
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model of the DAS problem. The emphasis of our 
analysis was placed on frequency-related ancillary 
services and fixed costs, namely start-up, shut-down 
and minimum-load cost. We stated various cases 
concerning the format of the objective function as well 
as the reserve pricing schemes. Shadow price, highest 
bid accepted and pay-as-bid approaches were discussed 
for reserve, and the impact on unit commitment was 
shown when the fixed costs were either included or 
excluded from the objective function. An 8-unit 
example was used to illustrate the results under the 
various cases and provide the magnitude order for 
payments and clearing prices. 
It was shown that if units submit truthful bids and are 
compensated with SMP for energy and RP for reserve, 
and even if they are remunerated for all their fixed 
costs, they may incur losses. Unless we want the units 
to bid over their true costs, as a response to such a 
market design, a compensation mechanism is needed to 
deal with this fact. The reserve payments can also 
contribute to the same direction, as we can assume that 
no direct costs are associated with their provision. 
However, although opportunity costs from holding 
capacity for reserve have not been addressed in our 
analysis, such costs do exist and must be taken into 
account. These issues combined with the strong 
interaction between the energy and reserve 
commodities, and the non-convexities that fixed costs 
introduce, make the DAS a very difficult and 
complicated problem. Careful and mostly incentive-
compatible design is needed, in order to provide the 
right economic signs in the electricity market. 
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Appendix 
 
Notation 
 
u  Generation unit 
h  Time period (hour: 1..24) 
,u hx  Vector of commodities for unit u , hour 
h  
,u hz  Vector of integer variables for unit u , 
hour h  
,u hc  Vector of cost coefficients of 
commodities for unit u , hour h  
u
d  Vector of fixed costs for unit u  
0
u
x  Initial condition for unit u  
(commodities) 
0
u
z  Initial condition for unit u  (integer 
variables) 
,1 2A A  Matrices of market-clearing constraints  
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ha  Vector. Right hand side of market 
clearing constraints (requirements) for 
hour h  
, ,
,
u h u h1 2B B  Matrices of technical constraints for unit 
u , hour h  
,u hb  Vector. Right hand side of technical 
constraints for unit u , hour h  
,u hG  Total generation (output) for unit u , hour 
h  
,u hR  Reserve included in DAS for unit u , 
hour h  
,u hST  Status (condition) for unit u , hour h . 
Binary variable. 1:Οn(line), 0:Off(line) 
,u hY  Start-up signal for unit u , hour h . 
Dependent binary variable. 1: Start-up 
,u hV  Shut-down signal for unit u , hour h . 
Dependent binary variable. 1: Shut-down 
,
g
u hP  Price of energy offer for unit u , hour h  
,
r
u hP  Price of reserve offer for unit u , hour h  
u
MLC  Minimum-load cost for unit u  
u
SUC  Start-up cost for unit u  
u
SDC  Shut-down cost for unit u  
hD  Demand (load) for hour h  
req
hR  Reserve requirement for hour h  
min
u
Q  Technical minimum for unit u  
max
u
Q  Technical maximum for unit u  
bid
u
R  Maximum reserve availability for unit u  
u
MU  Minimum up time for unit u  
u
MD  Minimum down time for unit u  
 
